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The Costs of Worker Displacement
ABSTRACT
This study defines the nature of worker displacement anddevelops a mechanism
for inferring the amount of losses caused by displacement in away that is
tied to economic theory. Data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamicsare
first used to identify the characteristics of displaced workers. Aftera
demonstration that usual methods of evaluating workers' losses cannotprovide
correct measures of the cost to society, a game—theoretic model determining
the amount of firm—specific investment in workers is developed. As workers'
and firms' horizons decrease, such investment will be reduced; this will be
exhibited in a flattening of the wage—tenure profile as the date of
displacement approaches. Examination of the profile thus provides a test
whether firms and workers have good information about impendingdisplacement.
Using the P5W data for workers displaced between 197? and 1981, the
study shows there is no significant flattening of the wage—tenure profile in
the entire sample. (However, some flattening does occuramong unionized
workers, and also among workers who are laid—off permanently from a plant that
remains open.) This suggests that workers are surprised by displacement, for
they continue investing in firm—specific human capitalup to the time of
displacement. The present value of the worker's share of the lost returns on
this investment is around $7000 (1980 dollars) under intermediateassumptions
about the real rate of discount, depreciation on such investment and the
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(517) 355—7349I. Introduction
Perhaps the liveliest recent discussion of labor—market policy has been
about declining industries and the workers attached to then. Calls foran
inchoate 'industrial policy;" proposals to aid "displacedworkers;' and
attempts to prevent future losses, are all responses to thisperceived
problem.1 In this study I consider themeaning of the notion "displaced
worker" and present a partial evaluation of the magnitude and burdenof the
costs produced by displacement. In essence the study thus examines thecosts
of adjustment to shifts in production, transaction costs thatare presumably
outweighed by the long—run improvement in the allocation of labor.
The term 'displaced worker' is not well specified.2 Therefore, Iuse a
national sample of workers to identify the characteristics o4 those whomight
be classified as displaced. Most important, the study devisesa method for
specifying and measuring the cost to society of these workers' job losses.
The output of this approach is an answer to the question whether workers
experience a loss in human capital upon losing their Jobs, or whether the loss
is solely a reduction in the rents (to characteristics such assex, race,
union status, etc.) that accrued on their previous Jobs. As such, it
provides a way of evaluating the costs of worker displacement that is more
closely grounded in economic theory than is the existing literature (which is
surinarized in Bal&uin, 1984). This method can provide the basis for schemes
that might be offered to compensate for losses attendant on worker
displacement.
II. Who Are Displaced Workers?
In order of increasing breadth, three definitions of a 'displaced worker'
can be appl ied to existing data. The narrowest includes only those workerswhose Job losses resulted from competition froni imports. Its difficulty is
its inabil it>' to identify which job losers are unemployed because of import
competition.3 Indeed, empirically it is difficult to distinguish these Job
losses front those that result from high cQsts induced by wage rates in excess
of those paid to otherwise identical workers.
A less narrow definition includes all workers whose jobs disappeared
because their employer closed the plant or business. The difficulty with this
definition is that it distinguishes artificially among workers depending on
whether the employer closed or merely curtailed operations. Thus a third, and
still wider definition, adds to these workers others who lost their jobs
through layoffs that were not part of the closing of an entire plant. In this
section I use these last two definitions to examine the characteristics of
workers who might be classified as displaced. One should note that both
definitions relate to the nature of workers' separation from their previous
jobs; neither depends upon their current labor—force status.
While other studies have counted workers who might be categorized as
'displaced,' none has been able to distinguish between the second and third
definitions.4 I use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to identify workers who
left their jobs either because they were laid off or because the employer's
business closed.5 I thus distinguish between workers identified as flaid—off'
and those called 'displaced,' even though both can be classified as displaced
according to the third definition above. iong national samples the PSID is
unique in making this distinction.
Table I presents estimates of the extent of displacement, and of the
characteristics of displaced workers, based on the PSID for the years 1969
through 1981.
6
The Table is based only on heads of households (since the data
are available only for them); some involuntary separations are missing, and
—2—Table 1




Percent in category (per annum) 1.8 3.7
Mean Age (Heads 18—64) 40.2 33.7 38.7
Percent Male 77.1 79.1 71.9
Education (Percent distribution)
0—8 13.9 11.9 5.6
9—11 24.4 28.5 14.8
12 36.4 37.7 35.2
13—15 14.2 13.0 16.3 )16 11.1 8.9 28.1
Race/Ethnicity (Percent distribution)
White 82.6 76.5 85.8
Black 14.1 18.1 11.4
Hispanic and other 3.3 5.4 2.9
Marital Status (Percent distribution)
Married 67.4 64.6 72.6
Single or. Widowed 17.5 21.0
27.4
Divorced or Separated is.i 15.4
acomputed from Institute for Social Research, Five ThousandFamilies—
Patterns of Economic Progress, Volume IV,p. 21, Volume V, p. 461.the data may be overstating or understating nationalaverage displacement
rates, depending on whether household heads are more or less likely to be
subject to displacement. As the Table shows, the rate of "displacement is
roughly half that of the layoff rate. Despite this difference1 though, a
surprisingly large fraction of workers lose their jobs each year because the
entire place of business closes.
Only two aspects of the demographic characteristics of job losers are
surprising. One would expect, given the cawuon practice (in both union and
nonunion establishments) of layoffs by inverse seniority, that permanently
laid—off workers are fairly young. This is borne out by a comparison to the
average age of all household heads in the P610 sample. However, displaced
household heads are not substantially older than the typical head in the
PSID.7 The incidence ofdisplacement does not fall disproportionately on the
older worker (though the burden of any private loss may). The other
unexpected characteristic is the fairly low percentage of displaced workers
who are married. Perhaps the unobserved characteristics of individuals who
are displaced from Jobs overlap those characteristics that led them to fail to
find satisfactory matches in the marriage market.
Both laid—off and displaced workers have lower educational attainment
than does the typical household head, and both groups are less likely to
contain non—Hispanic whites than the typical household. There is little
difference between laid—off and displaced workers in educational attainment.
However, it is noteworthy that the composition of this group of workers who
experience plant closings is much more representative of the racial/ethnic mix
of household heads than is that of laid—off workers. Using the broader
definition of displacement makes the problem more closely coincident with the
problems of minorities in the labor market. That both laid—off and displaced
—3—groups consist disproportionAtely of men is unsurprising given the lower
labor—force participation rates of female heads of households.
III. The Nature of the Losses
The large literature on displacement in the labor market stems mainly
from an interest in the effects of foreign competition. This literature has
evaluated the losses incurred by displaced workers using two approaches (often
together.) The first considers the value of the time the displaced worker
spends unemployed (Bale, 1976; Neumann, 1978); the second compares workers'
wages or earnings on the Job that was lost to those on the Job eventually
obtained (Jacobson, 1978; Jenkins—I'lontmarquette, 1979; Kiefer—Neumann, 1979;
Sandell—Shapiro, 1983; Glenday—Jenkins, 1984). Only if: 1) Workers realize
that the characteristics that produced rents on the previous Job have no
effect on the wage—offer distribution they must search over; 2) There is no
unemployment insurance; and 3) Earnings obtained on the previous Job are
adjusted appropriately, can one obtain a correct estimate of the cost to
society.
To see the first point, assume that the wage on the previous Job was:
(1) Wb =G(X,
where b denotes the previous Job, X is a vector of characteristics of the
worker that yield the sane return on average on the previous Job and in the
market generally, and Z is a vector of characteristics that cannot !. post be
expected to yield equal returns on subsequent jobs. Thus, for example, the
union status of the previous job (see Wachter, 1983); returns to racial or
ethnic favoritism, or accumulated firm—specific human capital are included in
7. Let the worker's reservation wage after displacement be characterized as:
—4—(2) r =HUL*,o*)
where the starred variables in H(.) are themean and standard deviation of the
density function of wages that the worker perceives at thetime of
displacement.
Assume the displaced worker searches a densityfunction of wages that is
in fact described by 4(W), O<W<—. Let F(W*) be thedistribution function of f
from 0 to (4*. Assuming for simpl icity that theworker samples one offer each
time period, the average duration ofunemployment, I?, will be 1/(1—F(W")], and
the wage rate on the worker's new Job will be:
(3)(4 =cwf(w)dwCl_F(Wr)]. a
Jwr
So long as Wisaffected by 2b' i.e. so long as the mean and varianceof the
ex (ante) perceived distribution of offeredwages are affected by
characteristics specific to the previous Job, the durationof unemployment and
the subsequent wage will be affected by thosecharacteristics. The duration
of unemployment will be longer and the subsequentwage will be higher than
otherwise.8 These biasesarise because workers leave their Jobs with inflated
expectations of how the market will reward them for some of the
characteristics that raised their wages there, because of problems in
-
. - r specifying the error structure of equations describing durationor (4
Simply relating wages before displacement to those obtainedon the next
Job, as is proposed in most of the studies cited above, will thusproduce
erroneous estimates of the social cost of displacement. As I haveshown,
there is an implicit simultaneity betweenwages on the two Jobs that works
through the relation between the reservation wage and thecomponents of
Even though those components may not be productive outsidethe original Job,
they will affect the entire function describingwages on subsequent Jobs. The
—5—second point follows from the same logic as the first: The presence of
unemployment insurance will induce workers to search longer, also producing
longer unemployment and a smaller drop in wages than would otherwise be the
case.
Ignoring these two problems, one must (see Sandell—Shapiro, 1983) adjust
wages (not wage functions) on the previous job for differences in the
components of Z between jobs. The difficulty with even this partial solution
to the errors implicit in before—after wage comparisons is that not all of
what is lost when the values of the components of Z change represents a loss
to society. For example, rents may have accrued because some factor that
protected the worker from competition may be lost if a new job is not
similarly protected. If the job from which the worker is displaced is
unionized, but the job subsequently obtained is not, the worker suffers a loss
in wages, ceteris paribus. However, the loss should not affect the ability of
employers in the union sector to fill jobs in the future.9
Also included in the loss may be a reduction in human capital. Workers
and firms invest in human capital expecting some horizon over which the
returns will be reaped. Impending displacement may represent a shortening of
the horizon and perhaps a capital loss to the worker and/or the firm. Here
the distinction between general and specific training is crucial. General
training is included in X; by definition it is as applicable in any subsequent
job as in the job that disappeared. Firm—specific human capital, however, is
included in and is lost when the worker leaves the firm. This investment
may have been made with the expectation of a longer payout period than in fact
occurred. Both the firm and the worker may suffer a capital loss because of
the separation, with the size of each party's loss dependent upon the length
of the payout period that was expected, the amount invested, and the sharing
—6—of investment costs.1°
These considerations suggest that the social costs in the labormarket
include at least the lost firm—specific human capital, measuredusing
information uncontaminated by the biases induced by the effect of
Zb Oil
subsequent wages. Firm—specific human capital is the only component in
that clearly has no productivity on any subsequent Job and thatrepresents an
investment on which the return may be below—market. Displaced workersmay
reap below—market returns on their investment in occupation— or
industry—specific skills; but, unless the entire occupation or industry
disappears at once, the magnitude of this loss is also affected by the
worker's search behavior in the face of a (possibly changing) distributionof
returns to these skills. Similarly, there is a social loss that ispositively
related to the excess of the displaced workers' marketwages over their
reservation wages, and to the duration of time they spend between Jobs. Both
components of the loss that occurs during the time the workers are unemployed
are affected by their search behavior, and thus possibly by characteristics of
their previous Jobs. For these reasons the remainder of this study examines
lost firm—specific investment, recognizing that societymay also lose both the
worker's labor services during the time between Jobs and part of a stream of
expected returns on investment in skills specific to an occupation or
industry.
IV. Inferring the Effects of Impending Displacement
Measuring lost firm—specific human capital is not an easy task, insofar
as the stock must be inferred from wages, and the costs of investment in
firm—specific human capital are shared by workers and firms. Nonetheless, one
can use data on wage—tenure profiles along with some consideration about the
—7—efficient split of investment costs between workers and firms to answer the
questions: 1) Is there any loss? That is, are investments being made that
have a payout period that extends beyond the date 04 displacement? and 2) If
so, which party, the worker or the firm., bears the costs of these H post poor
investments?
Consider the following technology for producing firm—specific training:
(4) B8(t)
where t is the fraction of the initial period of employment that is spent in
training. (All firm—specific training is assumed to take place during this
first period.) B is the amount that the training adds to the worker's
productivity each period; it is assumed constant over the entire life of the
investment.I assume that production of specific training is characterized by
diminishing returns, i.e., B'>O, B<O, and that B(O)0. The costs of producing
the training are also a function of t, with C(t) described by C', C>D, and
C(O)=O. There is little evidence either way on the assumptions describing the
shapes of B and C; I have merely made standard assumptions about
technologies.12 In making them I also ignore for simplicityany costs of
training other than the value of trainees' time.
The worker and the firm are assumed to have identical discount rates and
have utility functions U, U')O, U"<O, defined over the benefits and costs of
13
firm—specific training.Let T. be each party s horizon, the length of time
it expects to reap returns on the investment in specific training, where i
refers to the firm (F) or the worker (W). This assumption implies point
expectations about the duration of the job. It too is simplifying; but the
results carry through with the more realistic assumption that both workers and
firms maintain subjective probability distributions about the job's duration.
—B—The worker bears some fraction s of the cost of the investment andreaps
that same fraction of the expected returns. The worker's expected utility
stream is thus defined as:
Tw
(5) —U(sB(t))E Dk + U(—sC(t)),
k-i
where D is the discounting factor 1/Citri.
ZF identical to Z except 1—s
replaces s, and TF replaces Tw.
Because this is a shared investment, in which each side has monopoly
power, the outcomes, t*, the optimal fraction of the initial period spent
investing, and s*, the optimal fraction of the benefits and costs accruing to
the worker1 are subject to bargaining between the firm and the worker. The
Nash equilibrium solution to this bargaining problem is the pair Ct*, s*) that
max imi zes:
(6)Z =
AssumingTF =Twithe assumption of identical discount rates and utility
functions produces the standard Nash result that s*=.5, and some t*)O if
(t*)O T. ) >Z ( t*=O IT. )
I I I I
The burden of displacement is based in the parties' expectations about
the nature of the shortened horizon over which the shared returns to the
investment in firm—specific training will be reaped. Thus the nature of the
information available to both sides about the continued existence of the job
in which the investment has been made determines tIE and s*.I examine cases
in which the information available to each party is identical (symmetric), and
in which the firm has better information about the job's impending demise
<asymmetric). Asyrwuetry in the opposite direction, udth the worker better able
to foresee the job's disappearance, seems unlikely given the firm's control
—9—over decisions about operating its plant.
CASEl.A.SynvnetrjcLackof Information
In this case neither party is aware that the job willdisappear until the
day the firm discovers that its profit—maximizing conditions dictate thatthe
worker be laid—off permanently (or the plant closed). Thus at all timesup to
the date of separation the horizon seen by workers and the firm isunchanged
at TFTW, both greater than the jpostpayout period of the returns to the
investment. Since in this case the information is identical to what it isin
the absence of any information about the job's disappearance, the outcomeof
the bargaining problem that determines t* and s* is unchanged. Bothparties
will experience a capital loss when the displacement occurs.
CASE LB. Syniietric Information About Impending Displacement
Assume in this case that the worker and the firm real ize that, because of
an exogenous drop in product demand, the worker's expected tenure in the firm
has dropped to T'w<Tu. Because information is synrnetric,T'F=T'W. This change
reduces both parties' perceived utility from investing in specifictraining.
If training is still profitable at some t*>O, it will be undertaken.And,
since the are still equal (though reduced), 5*remainsat .b. Given the
assumptions about the shapes of B and C, though, t*'<t*: With a shorter
horizon over which to reap the returns to firm—specific training, a smaller
investment in such training will be made. The size of the profitover which
the parties bargain will be smaller. For some 1* the investment willno
longer be profitable and t* will be zero.
Case II. Asymmetric Information
—10—— 11—
Asyirnetric information about an impending Job loss presumably means that
both the worker and the employer realize the horizon has shortened, but the
firm acquires this information first. However, the general nature of the
problem can be analyzed Just as well if we assume that the worker has no
knowledge that the layoff is inninent, while the firm knows the horizon has
shortened. Thus:
T•'w = >T' ) 0.
This means that the stream of returns seen by the firm is lower forevery t at
s*.5 than that perceived (incorrectly) by the worker.
Because information is asynvnetric, the Nash solution no longer applies;
and unfortunately the game—theory literature has not produced an explicit
solution to the noncooperative game implicit in the assumption of asynwnetry.
Let us therefore merely consider two possible situations under this
assumption. If TF is sufficiently short, the firm will realize that it cannot
make any profit if s<1. The solution is no longer bargained: The amount
invested is determined solely by the worker maximizingZ with s*=1, with t*
smaller than before due to the shape of the worker's utility function. If
TF
is not this short, the parties are engaged in a noncooperative bargaining
situation. While nothing can be inferred with certainty about the outconie,
one might assume that continuity applies. If so, as TF increases Just beyond
the point where the firm is indifferent about taking part in bargaining over s
and t, s will be close to one. That being the case, t* will also be lower
than it was before the firm acquired information that led it to revise its
horizon.
-
Onemight ask why workers do not recognize that an increase in s* signals
that has decreased and reduce Tw too. This question is equivalent toviewing the bargaining process over s and t as a supergame, in which each
party learns from the outcome of a particular solution Ct*, *)something
about the other party's horizon and modifies its own behavioraccordingly on
the next round. Indeed, if there were sufficient rounds in sucha supergame
and the firm knew with certainty the date of closing, there would beno loss
from displacement: Workers and firms would repeatedly modify the amountand
sharing of investment based on the firm's horizon, as revealed by the outcomes
of the previous stage. Investment would occur along a path such that the
value of firm—specific human capital was zero at the date ofdisplacement.
What the empirical work in this study does is test whether in fact information
is sufficient and the parties are clever enough bargainers to avoid
investments that will not pay off.
The likely outcomes on s* and t*, both the Nash solutions whenTF=TW and
the results when information is asymmetric, are shown in Figure 1as functions
of TF and The greater the divergence between the parties' horizons, the
more the spl it in the benef its and costs of the investment differs from •514
The shorter the horizons become, the smaller the investment will be.
This discussion allows us to use changing wage—tenure profiles to infer
the information available to displaced workers and their employers. 1) If the
profile does not change as workers near displacement, either Case l.A. is
correct, or Case Ii is valid, but workers' horizons have decreased somewhat.
2) If the profile becomes flatter as the date of displacement drawsnearer,
either Case I.B. is correct, and firms and workers have thesame, fairly good
information about the impending displacement; or the asymmetric case II is
correct, but the worker's information is sufficient to reduce the total amount
invested by more than enough to offset the worker's increased share of the































































 displacement approaches, we may infer that the asywinetric case Is correct
4flg that the total amount invested (t*) does not decrease greatly. (If it
did, the wage—tenure profile would be unchanged or flattened.16)
Workers in firms in which the risk of involuntary separation islarger,
other things equal, receive a compensatingwage differential
(Abowd—Ashenfelter, 1981; Topel, 1984) for the risk of unemployment,perhaps
one sufficient to compensate also for the potential loss of firm—specific
human capital. Both displaced workers and others in thesame firms will
receive this extra pay. What is considered here is whether thereare any
losses of such capital, or whether the differential need onlycompensate for
the time the displaced workers expects to spend unemployed.
V. Measurement and Estimation
!n this and the next section 1 examine the determinants ofwages of both
displaced and laid—off workers. The basic equations to be estimated are of
the form:
(7)ln w =fl+VP
where w is the wage on the worker's main Job, 2 is a vector of control
variables, and 2' is a vector containing measures of total experience and
tenure. The data used are from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics,
The P5W has the virtue of providing a long, continuouspanel, but it has
one severe drawback for our purpose: Tenure with the employer, a measure of
the time available for investment in firm—specific training, isreported only
in the interviews of 1976 and 1977.17 Since the mainpurpose is to observe the
wage—tenure relationship among workers who are later displaced, this lack
greatly restricts the number of observations from the PSID that can be used.
—13—(Because no information on the tenure of people who report themselves
displaced in 1976 or earlier is available, only people displaced between 1977
through 1981 have the required information.) The paucity of data on tenure
with the employer combines with workers' mobility to limit thesample still
further: Many of the workers involuntarily separated in,e.g., 1981 had
changed jobs several times since 1977, when their tenure was last reported)-8
Equation (7) is estimated using observations for years 1—1, T—2, T—3 and
T—4, where, as before, T is the date of involuntary separation.19 Starting
with 1421 household heads who left their jobs because of apermanent layoff or
a plant closing in 1977—1981, the exclusions reduce the sample sizes in the
estimates of (7) in years 1—i, i1,...,4, to 362, 305, 246 and 200
observations respectively. Of these people, 36 percent of those included in
the samples for 1—2, 7—3 and 1—4 were displaced workers, while 33percent of
the sample for T—1 were.
The variables included in 2 are standard in equations like (7).nong
them are: Years of formal education, or a vector a dumy variables for
completion of college, some college, or completion of high school; whether the
worker is a union member, white, married, or male; whether the worker resides
in the South or in an SN in which the largest city has apopulation above
500,000; the worker's occupation in the job that disappeared (professional or
manager, craft, or operative or laborer); and the industry of that job
(manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, or finance and services). The
means of these variables in the four samples suggest these involuntarily
separated workers are not typical of the U.S. labor force: There are fewer
whites, more Southerners and more manufacturing workers. These differences
are consistent with the P910's oversampling of low—income households and with
the greater propensity of manufacturing employers to lay off workers.
—14—The variables included in 2' are tenure with theemployer, TN, and years
of actual full—time labor—market experience sinceage 18, X. A quadratic term
in experience is also included in the equations, as isa quadratic term in
tenure in some of the estimates. The average tenure prior to involuntary
separation is only five years. Nonetheless, between 33 and 37 percent 04 the
workers in the four samples had more than five years' tenure with their
employer, and between 17 and 20 percent had at least ten years of tenure. The
average total experience in the samples impl ies a mean age in the middle
thirties, roughly what is implied for all laid—off and displaced workers in
Table 1.
VI. Estimates of Wage Profiles MonQ Displaced and Laid—off Workers
The estimates of P in (7) for those variables not in P are shown in
Table A.!. The results are quite standard among estimates ofwage equations
using micro data and merit little conitient here. Suffice it to note that their
very rout ineness suggests that, along most dimensions that produce wage
differentials, the particular samples selected from the P210 are not unusual.
Table 2 presents the estimates of the parameters on the experience and
tenure variables from (7), including only a linear term in tenure. The
wage—experience profiles have shapes that have generally been found in
research in this area (e.g., Mincer—Jovanovic, 1981). However, the results in
Table 3, which include a quadratic term in tenure, show only slight evidence
of the usual concavity in the wage—tenure profile. This may result froni the
peculiar nature of the sample, from the use of tenure with the employer
instead of the less appropriate tenure in the Job that has been used in many
studies, or from the relatively small samples that the focus on involuntary
separations produces.
—15—The major issue of interest in this study is the pattern o4 effects of
tenure with the firm. As a comparison of the coefficients in Table 2 on this
variable makes clear, there may be some flattening of the wage—tenure profile,
but it is not very pronounced. The profile is still far from flat even in the
year ininediately preceding displacement.2° It may of course be that the
profiles for all four years are much flatter than those for years t—5 and
earl ier, and flatter than those for workers who are not separated
involuntarily. However, the slopes in Table 2 are remarkably close to those
produced by Altonji—Shakotko (1984) using similarly specified equations
covering employed white males in the PSID.
Consider how the wage—tenure profiles vary with the worker's union
status. Trade—union wage—setting differs from that in nonunion plants in the
effects of experience on wage rates (see Johnson—Youmans, 1971) and in how
workers process information about the workplace (see Freeman, 1980). It may be
that unionized workers, merely because the union provides a means of gathering
information about the employer's plans, avoid investments in specific human
capital that will not pay off, an avoidance that would be reflected in
wage—tenure profiles that flatten out as displacement approaches.
The results of estimating (7) including interaction terms of experience
and tenure with union membership are shown in Table 4. While the vector of
interaction terms is not jointly significantly different from zero, the
results are nonetheless suggestive. The use of a quadratic in X makes it
difficult to infer the effect of unionism on changes in the wage—experience
profile simply by inspection, and I defer the discussion of that issue.
However, inspection of the interaction terms with tenure suggests a striking
pattern: The wage—tenure profiles for union workers are much steeper in the
third and fourth years before displacement than they are in the first and
—14—Table 2
































at_statistics in parentheses here and in Tables 3—5. Theestimates are from
equations in which the full vector of variables Z is included.Table 3
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(.47)second years: Among union workers the slopes are .015 and .013 in years 1—3
and 1—4, and .006 and 0 in years 1—1 and 1—2. Among nonunion workers there is
essentially no change in the steepness of the wage—tenure profile as
displacement nears. This difference is co.nsistent with the role of unions in
providing information that protects workers from management discretion, in
this case, information about impending involuntary separation.
Another possible difference in behavior may arise in those plants that
experience closings. In such cases the employer may make more of an effort to
hide information than in cases when an isolated worker, or group of workers,
is to be laid off. To examine this possibility equations (7) were reestimated
including interaction terms of the tenure and experience variables with th
reason for involuntary separation. The results are shan in Table 5. The
vector of interaction terms is jointly significant in the equations for year
1—4, though not in the other equations. Most interesting, the implied slopes
of the wage—tenure profiles decl me steadily from .0213 to .0054 as the date
of layoff approaches. Apparently, workers facing layoff obtain enough
information about it to reduce their firm—specific investment. This is not
true among the one—third of the sample who lose their jobs because of plant
closings: The coefficients on TN alone in Table 5 shu that the slope of the
wage—tenure profile increases steadily as the date of closing nears.21
The constancy of the slope of the wage—tenure profile with impending
displacement suggests eith!r that there is an asynnietry in the information
available to workers and their employers about the timing of the displacement,
or that neither party can plan well for it. Since it is unlikely that workers
have more information than their employers, the invariance of the wage—tenure
profiles with time remaining until separation shows that there is a high
degree of ignorance on the part of the workers. if workers' knowledge of the
—17—Table S
Tenure and Experience Variables, Including Interactions





















































(2.41)impending displacement were less than employers', but still substantial, total
firm—specific investment would drop so much that workers' costs of an
increased share of the investment would fall •22
Because the quadratic terms in experience make it difficult to infer any
changes in the pattern of investment in general training as the date of
displacement approaches, for each year before displacement Table 6 shows the
average wage in the samples as a function of experience, evaluated at the
means of the other variables. The clearest result is the lack of change in
the wage—experience profile as displacement approaches. Even among union
workers, whose wage—tenure profiles indicated they had fairly good information
about the displacement, the wage—experience profile changes little. Only when
the profiles are calculated for laid—off workers separately is there a
noticeable steepening, while among workers affected by plant closings the
profile flattens out.
At first consideration the results for the subgroups, and for the entire
sample, are surprising. If workers were fully rational, had perfect
information about the impending displacement, and did not face any liquidity
constraints, they would invest more in firm—general training, the nearer the
time when they would need such training to obtain a job in another firm.I
have shown, though, that workers do not have good information about the
approaching displacement. The results for the entire sample can be
rationalized by noting that workers who face liquidity constraints must trade
off investment in general training for investment in firm—specific training.
Since they do not change the pattern of investment in specific training, they
are unable to change that in general training. Undoubtedly other explanations
can be offered, but this one is at least consistent with utility—maximizing
behavior, the inferences I have made about investment in firm—specific
—18—training, and the evidence for the entire sample. This view also explains the
differences in the changing wage—experience profiles between laid—off and
displaced workers: The former exhibit a steepening wage—experience profile
along with a flattening wage—tenure profile, while the opposite pattern exists
for workers who face plant closings.
VII. Estimating the Loss
The value of lost firm—specific investment can be estimated using the
results from Section VI along with assumptions about quit behavior. I
calculate only the social cost attributable to the worker: The total cost to
society of the lost specific human capital——the sum of the worker's and the
firm's losses——cannot be calculated without extraneous information on changes
in s* as the date of displacement approaches. Whether these are losses that
should be compensated is not at issue here; all I am measuring is the size of
the range of negative returns on firm—specific investment.
The present value of the loss for the typical worker with TN years of





where L is the loss; P is the probability the worker would otherwise have been
employed in the firm t years after displacement; A is the worker's age; H is
hours worked per year; w*(TN) is the wage rate gross of the cost of investment
in specific training for a worker with Th years of tenure, and w(O) is the
wage rate the same person would get with tenure of zero years; r is the
discount rate, andis the rate of depreciation of firm—specific investment.
Throughout I assume H=2000; L is calculated over the range of values of r and
& on the intervals tO, .101 and 1.05, .15] respectively.23
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10 15 20 25
All Workers
1 $5.36 $5.58 $5.73 $5.81 $5.82
2 5.33 5.76 6.10 6.34 6.47
3 5.40 5.71 5.91 5.98 5.91
4 5.65 5.95 6.14 6.20 6.13
Displaced
1 5.63 5.88 6.04 6.11 6.08
2 5.43 5.97 6.42 6.73 6.89
3 5.83 6.11 6.27 6.30 6.19
4 6.29 6.70 6.96 7.01 7.01
Laid—Off
1 5.24 5.41 5.54 5.62 5.66
2 5.35 5.60 5.83 6.00 6.13
3 5.34 5.58 5.73 5.77 5.71
4 5.57 5.86 5.99 5.97 5.79
Nonunion
1 5.03 5.19 5.29 5.33 5.32
2 5.09 5.41 5.67 5.84 5.92
3 4.99 5.29 5.49 5.56 5.50
4 5.08 5.31 5.45 5.48 5.42
U ni on
1 6.30 6.66 7.00 7.30 7.55
2 5.86 6.48 7.07 7.59 8.04
3 5.90 6.27 6.52 6.64 6.62
4 6.74 7.42 7.83 7.92 7.68The wage loss is estimated using the quadratic wage—tenureprofile for
T—I that is presented in Table 3. The effect of tenureon the worker's net
wage is calculated using the coefficients on TN and TN2 from that regression.
The gross wage loss, however, is the appropriatemeasure to use in estimating
the value of lost firm—specific investment, since itmeasures the current
return on the stock of past firm—specific investment withoutsubtracting any
current investment. It is calculated using the coefficients from thissame
regression under the assumptions that the rates of return to education and
firm—specific training are equal, and that the ratio of investment in
firm—specific training declines linearly with years of tenure (Mincer, 1974).
I assume that workers would have remained in the firm unless theyquit
voluntarily. Thus P is calculated as:
t
(9) P(TN+t) —II[1—q (k)1.
k-O
where is the voluntary quit rate of a worker with TN years of tenure.
Since q cannot be calculated for the workers on whom the estimates inSection
VI are based, I use estimates of quit rates as functions of workers'
characteristics based on micro data sets with broadcoverage. Three of the
available studies——Freeman (1980); Mincer—Jovanovic (1981), and Viscusi
(1980)——are based on the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.24 Theother, Mitchell
(1982), uses the Quality of Employment Surveys for 1973 and 1977.
The loss in <8) is calculated for each of the 362 displaced workers
included in the sample over whom equation (7) was estimated for theyear
before displacement. The average loss in the sample is presented in Table 7
for each of the four quit functions and for variouspairs of r and S. The
estimated losses (in 1980 dollars) are quite large, even when high values of
the discount and depreciation rates are assumed. The failure of workers who
—20—are later displaced to adjust the path of investment in firm—specifictraining
generates large losses for them when the displacement occurs.25 One should
remember that I have excluded the firm's share of lost specific training, and
have not included the value of lost occupation— or industry—specifictraining,
or the value of time unemployed. Viewed this way the social cost of worker
displacement seems quite large compared to the measures of workers' losses
that have been produced in the literature.
VU]. Conclusions
In this study I have shown how changes in the horizon for a shared
investment like that in firm—specific training a4fect the amount and burden of
that investment.I have used the predictions of that demonstration to analyze
how the wage—tenure profile changes in a particular sample of workers as they
approach the date of their displacement. The estimates indicate that
involuntarily separated workers incur a loss in the form of an unexpected
depreciation of the firm—specific human capital in which they have invested.
This loss is one component of the social cost of labor—market adjustment.
Other components——including the value of the time displaced workers spend
unemployed, and the value of lost occupation— and industry—specific
training——must be added to obtain an estimate of the total cost of
labor—market adjustment.
—21—Table 7. Average Present Value of Lost SpecificTraining
(in thousands)
(r, 6)
(0, .05) (0, .10) (.05, .10) (.10,10)(.10, .15)
Quit Function
Freeman (1980) $11.5 $8.3 $6.5 $5.4 $4.7 PSID 1968—74
logit, all workers
Mincer—Jovanovic (1981) 10.6 7.9 6.2 5.2 4.6
PSID 1975—76,
OLS, men




Vigcusj (1980) 12.1 8.8 6.8 5.7 4.9
PSID 1975—76,
logit, men and women
separately
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—24—FOOThOTES
1.One example of this kind of response is the introduction of bills requiring
prior notification of a plant closing. The. 'National Employment Priorities
Act,' 98:1, H.R. 284?, mandates at least one year's prior notification of a
permanent layoff or a plant closing involving more than 100 workers. Such
legislation is similar to what exists in many other developed countries.
2. See Congressional Budget Office, fliclnrat.d Unrkpp: 1ci'sg Fpilsrpl
flptinnc,July 1982, Chapter 3, for discussion of various approaches to
defining the issue.
3. In the 1960s this difficulty coupled with politics to preventany payments
to workers under the Trade Adjustment Assistance Act of 1962. Beginning in
1969 payments were made increasingly to workers whose employer'sproduct
market merely contained foreign competitors.
4. Congressional Budget Office, cit., uses the Current Population Survey
to classify unemployed workers, but does not base its criteria for
displacement on the reason for job loss. Sandell—Shapiro (1983) estimate the
economic and demographic characteristics of job losers, not classified by
reason for loss, in a sample of older workers only.
5. Currently employed workers were considered to be laid—off or displaced if
they changed employers for one of these reasons within the past year.
Unemployed or retired individuals were counted as laid—off or displaced in the
most recent year in which they reported the involuntary separation.
6. All the information is calculated using the survey's sampling weights (so
that the characteristics are comparable to national averages).
7. This finding contrasts with the evidence in Wilcock and Franke (1963,p.
40) showing a median age above 45 among workers displaced in theclosings of a
group of meat—packing plants.
8. That the previous wage, not merely the components of the vectorX, affects
the reservation wage is suggested by the results of Kiefer—Neumann (1979) and
Sandell (1980).
9. I assume, following Farber (1983), that such jobs must be rationed.
10. Obviously, some firms and workers whose relationship lasts longer than
they expected will experience unexpectedly high returns on their joint
investment. For that reason these estimates may be viewed as tests for the
existence of, and measures of he size of, the lower tail of the distribution
of returns to firm—specific investment. Since many social policies focus on
compensating people in the lower tails of various distributions, e.g., income,
weeks employed, this approach is consistent with the analysis of other
policies.
11. That there are such skills is suggested by Shaw (1984). In addition to the
—25—labor—market costs that are ignored, there are othercosts, such as unexpected
capital losses on innobile housing stocks, that must be included ina complete
accounting of the social costs of adjustment to industrialchange.
12. All that is required for the results togo through is that 9 < C.
13. This too is a simplifying assumptiondesigned to ease the exposition; the
results do not depend on it.
-
14.Obviously, if the 2. differ the split will not be centered on.5; but the
qualitative results will remain unchanged.
15. See, for example, Mincer—Jovanovic, 1981, foran example linking these
profiles to patterns of firm—specific investment. While theargument here and
in most of the literature has based the wage—tenureprofile on investment in
firm—specific training, one might inquire whether a similar linkcould be
estabi ished in a model of bonding such as Lazear's (1981). Ifboth parties'
horizons suddenly shorten in such a model, new workers willbe less willing to
forego current wages in exchange for higher wages later. Indeed, witha
sufficiently short horizon workers will not sacrificeany current wages, and
the profile will be flat. Thus the bonding modelseems observationally
equivalent to the model developed here; in both a flattening of the
wage—tenure profile implies workers have acquired substantial information.
(However, the models may have substantially different implications for
appropriate policies on compensation,)
16. Hashimoto (1975) was the first to recognize theimportance of the
specific—general distinction in discussing worker displacement.However, he
ignored the game—theoretic aspects of specific investment and theeffect of
changing horizons, and provided no link between empirical results and the
theory of specific investment. Bartel—Bor,jas (1981)were also aware of the
role of specific training in separations, but they did notfocus on the
wage—tenure profile's relation to time remaining on the jobas we do below.
17. While tenure in a particular Job is availablemore often in this panel,
that measure does not reflect firm—specific investmentvery well. Consider
two workers, one with the firm for five yearson five separate Jobs, each
lasting a year, the other in the firm for one year on thesame Job. Though
each has tenure of one year on the job, theappropriateness of using total
tenure is apparent.
18. Yet another problem limiting the sample size is therestriction of the
data to household heads. Since some small fraction (below 10percent) of the
households change heads each year, and since the data of interestare reported
for household heads, observations must be discarded becausethe information on
tenure and other variables cannot be linked to the date ofdisplacement.
19. As people separated involuntarily in 1977—81are included in the sample,
wage rates are made comparable across calendar time for T—i
,i=1,. . ,4,by
inflating using the growth in private nonfarm hourly earnings between the time
the worker's wage is observed and 1980.
20. One possibility that might explain the apparent lack offlattening is that
the linear, and even the quadratic forms of TNmisspecify the equation, and
that newer workers must be treated separately. To examine this Ireestimated
—26—(7) for each of the four samples, first includinga duirny variable for workers
with at most 1 year of tenure, then includinga duriwny variable for those with
at most 2 years of tenure. Only one of these eight variablesadded
significantly to the equations' explanatory power, and in nocase did their
addition change the inference that there is littleflattening of the profile
as displacement approaches.
21. Equations (7) were also estimated separately foryears T—1...T—4 for the
samples disaggregated by union status, and disaggregated by reason for
involuntary separation. Only for T—4 was the hypothesis that the
layoff—displaced subsainples could be pooled rejected at the 5—percent level of
confidence, and only for 1—1 for the union—nonunion disaggregationwas the
hypothesis rejected even at the 10—percent level.
22. This conclusion corroborates the sense ofsurprise expressed by workers
and their representatives when plants close. One local unionpresident
discussed how his employer expanded for severalyears and then,...wewere
notified that in three weeks we would be shut down. Thepeople in the town
were quite shocked.... It completely caught us off guard.' (JamesSavoy,
"Statement, House Subcommittee on Labor—Management Relations, 98:2,
liaatings, May 4, 1984.
23. This range brackets the estimates of the rate ofdepreciation of
on—the—job training in Johnson (1970).
24. Because Mincer—Jovanovic use OLS estimation, the simulatedquit rate
becomes negative for high values of tenure in the firm.I arbitrarily
restrict q to be nonnegative in the simulations.
25. Since these estimates exclude lost fringe benefits,particularly unvested
pension benefits, even they underestimate the lost future remuneration.
—27—table A.l
Estimates of Other Coefficients in the Regression in Table 21"
Years Before Displacement
Variable i 2 3 4
Education .0358 .0400
(4.75) (4.80)
Union Member .288 .230 .176 .313
(6.01) (4.43) (3.36) (5.62)
White .128 .047 .092 .171
(2.98) (.90) (1.71) (3.34)
Married .oso .052 .095 —.073
(.92) (.77) (1.37) (—1.04)
hale .317 .303 .301 .454
(4.77) (3.80) (3.66) (5.75)
South —.182 —.139 —.035 .025
(—4.36) (—2.79) (—.63) (.45)
SMSA with city .026 .099 .097 .128
> 500,000 (.60) (2.05) (1.80) (2.39)
Industry:
Manufacturing —.12 6 —.064 —.028 —.082
(—2.48) (—1.23) (—.51) (—1.47)
Trade —.269 —.127 .018 —.068
(—4.73) (—2.11) (.27) (—1.00)
Finance and Services —.172 —.116 —.041 —.073
(—2.97) (—1.78) (—.57) (—1.05)
Occupation:
Professionals and Managers .332 .502 .471 .466
(5.08) (7.02) (5.20) (4.71)
Craft Workers .182 .308 .304 .234
(2.81) (4.16) (3.91) (2.91)
Operatives and Laborers .044 .144 .043 .071
(.72) (2.30) (.64) (1.06)
at_statistics in parentheses.
bA vector of three dummy variablesindicating schooling attainment was included.